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Soft Law and the Development of
Norms and Trust in Countering the
Terrorist Threat: Engaging the Faith
Communities in Post–9/11
Singapore
Eugene K. B. Tan
On July 6, 2010, Singapore’s Internal Security Department (ISD)
announced that a “self-radicalized,” full-time national serviceman
had been detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since April
4, 2010. Muhammad Fadil bin Abdul Hamid (Fadil), age 20, would
be detained under the ISA for two years in the first instance. Accord-
ing to the media statement, Fadil had become convinced that “it was
his religious duty to undertake armed jihad alongside fellow mili-
tants and strive for martyrdom.” According to local media reports,
Fadilwas the sixthknowncaseof self-radicalization. Fadilwas subse-
quently released on a Restriction Order on April 4, 2012.1
EUGENE K. B. TAN (LL.B (Hons), National University of Singapore; MSc, London
School of Economics and Political Science, JSM, Stanford University) is associate
professor of law at the School of Law at Singapore Management University.
Besides constitutional and administrative law, the author’s interdisciplinary
research interests include themutual interactionof lawandpublic policy, the reg-
ulation of ethnic conflict, and the government and politics of Singapore. This
research was supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education (MOE) Academic
ResearchFund (AcRF)Tier 1grant. It buildsonearlierwork Ipublished inLawand
Policy and Terrorism and Political Violence. I thank the two anonymous reviewers
for their comments, suggestions, and insights.
1. Themedia statement describes the RestrictionOrder in the followingmanner:
“A person issued with a Restriction Order (RO) must abide by several conditions
and restrictions. For example, he is not permitted to change his residence or
employment, or travel outof Singapore,without thepriorapproval of theDirector
ISD. The individual issued with RO also cannot issue public statements, address
public meetings or print, distribute, contribute to or be involved in any publica-
tion, duplicate or disseminate any audio or video recording, hold office in, or be
a member of any organisation, association or group without the prior approval
of Director ISD. He must also report to ISD at specified times and dates, and
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Since 2001, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on Amer-
ican soil, there have been regular announcements of the detention
and release of, as well as the imposition of Restriction Orders on
alleged terrorists in Singapore. These announcements have become
routine and do not arouse much concern nor engender debate
openly within the Singaporean polity. Nonetheless, self-radicaliza-
tion is a matter of growing concern for the Islamic Religious Council
of Singapore (orMajlis Ugama Islam Singapura [MUIS]). In response
to media queries, MUIS expressed its “deep concern” on radicaliza-
tion through the Internet and other new media platforms. MUIS
urged theMuslimSingaporean community to “remain constantly vig-
ilant to the threatofself-radicalization in thecommunityasthe threat
remains at a global level.” It also stated, “Violence andmilitancy have
nothing to do with the teachings of Islam.” MUIS added, “We must
treasure and safeguard the strong foundation of mutual respect,
peace, and harmony in our multi-racial, multi-religious nation.”2
This relative calm stands in stark contrast to the anxiety andpalpa-
blepanic following several roundsof arrests anddetentionof “home-
grown” Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist suspects in Singapore under
the ISA in late 2001 and early 2002. The atmosphere ofmutual suspi-
cion and distrust betweenMalayMuslims and non-Muslims thenwas
palpable and disconcerting. But it should also be acknowledged that
someuneasinesswas expressed indiscussionsover Fadil’s detention
by no fewer than four cabinet ministers.
In March 2013, another self-radicalized individual, Abdul Basheer
Abdul Kader, was rearrested and placed under detention after he
wasfoundtohaverevertedtohispast interest inundertakingmilitant
jihad abroad. Abdul Basheer was first detained under the ISA in
February 2007 after he had allegedly made specific plans to pursue
militant jihad in Afghanistan. He was released three years later and
had made some progress in reintegrating into society. There was
little public concern when Abdul Basheer’s second detention was
reported. Similarly, in 2015, the arrests and detentions of persons,
including youths, influenced by ISIS’s online radical propaganda
presenthimself forcounselling and/or interviewsas requiredby theDirector ISD.
Hemaybe re-detainedshouldhe fail to respect theseconditionsandrestrictions.”
See SingaporeMinistry of HomeAffairsmedial statement “Detention, Imposition
of Restriction Orders and Release Under the Internal Security Act, July 6,
2010, available at https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/press-releases/Pages/
Detention-Imposition-Of-Restriction-Orders-And-Release-Under-The-Internal-
Security-Act-06-July-2010.aspx.
2. See MUIS press statement of July 7, 2010, “Response to Media Enquiries on
Detention, Imposition of RestrictionOrders on3 Individuals.”MUIS is a statutory
board tasked with regulating Muslim religious affairs and advising the govern-
ment in matters relating to Islam.
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andwhoweremaking plans to fight in Syria or commit violent acts in
Singapore have not raised a moral panic.3
It is a sign of the times. In the post–9/11age, it is a cliche´ that states
must takemattersof faith seriously.Muslimminorities inmanyparts
of the world are under “siege” or perceive themselves to be under a
pall of suspicion, distrust, and danger. Yet, it is in such trying times
that pluralistic societies are put through the litmus test of how resil-
ient theyare incopingandadapting to thechanging faithandsecurity
landscape, particularly for theMuslim communities and the national
securityestablishment.Questionshavebeen raisedover Islam’s com-
patibilitywith the contemporaryworld, the loyalty and integration of
Muslimcommunities, and the viabilityofmulticulturalismasan inte-
grativemechanismandsocial glue.4 Itwouldnotbeanoverstatement
to say that these are pivotal times thatmanymultiracial andmultire-
ligious societies are encountering.
Thisarticleseekstoexaminethe interactionofpoliticswithreligionin
Singapore, with special reference to its small but significant Muslim
communitysince9/11. Inparticular, it analyzeshowMuslimSingapor-
eans are adapting and responding given that Islamist religious extrem-
ismandviolence ispresentedasbeing“byfar themostserious[security
problem] that we have faced since the communist problem.”5 Having
declared itself “an iconic target” for terrorists, Singapore is effectively
gearing itself for the inevitability of a terrorist attack on its soil.6 In
the aftermath of a terrorist attack, especially by homegrown perpetra-
tors, the policymakers’ primary concern is the potential backlash
against the minority Muslim community and the unraveling of Singa-
pore’s social fabric.
In this article, I explore the increasing use of “soft law” (such as
codes of conduct, guidelines) at the macro- and micropolicy level by
the authorities as part of the regulatory mechanism in matters con-
cerning religion. Thegovernment’s approach canbedescribed as ide-
ational in that it seeks to engender a shift in majority–minority/
societal relations at one level and government and the Muslim
community relations at another. These ideals embody the rules,
3. Since January 2002,more than sixtypeople, allmen, havebeendetainedunder
the ISA for their involvement in terrorism-related activities. As of July 9, 2014,
more than four-fifths of those detained under the Internal Security Act since
January 2002 for their involvement in terrorism-related activities have since
been released after they were assessed to have been rehabilitated. Information
providedby theMinistryofHomeAffairs, Singapore, on September 24, 2014 (cor-
respondence on file with author).
4. Onthesituation in theUnitedKingdom,seeDerekMcGhee,TheEndofMulticul-
turalism: Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights (Berkshire, UK: Open Univer-
sity Press and McGraw-Hill, 2008).
5. “Not the Terror, but the Fallout,” Today, February 10, 2006.
6. “Threat of Terror Strike Far from Over,” The Straits Times, August 28, 2004.
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institutions,andnormstoself-regulatebehaviorat the individualand
community levels. Besides the diminishing returns of a coercive,
hard-law approach, the whole-of-society approach entails civil
societybeingconsciously inductedtomaintainandenhancereligious
harmony and avoid the incivility spiral in which distrust, fear, and
suspicion catalyze the breakdown and unraveling of Singapore’s
social fabric in the face of religious fervorand extremism. In counter-
ing the terrorist threat, the approach has evolved rapidly from a
whole-of-government to a whole-of-society approach, a significant
recognition that the security of the state, government, and society
are intimately connected. The terrorism threat requires not just a
security response but also a holistic one—one that seeks to align
the “hearts andminds”of the faith communities to the societal objec-
tive of harmony and peace.
In the first part of this article, I frame the socio-legal regulation of
social conduct and religious anxieties through the use of hard- and
soft-law approaches. In the second part, I briefly describe the Singa-
porean religious landscape before discussing the phenomenon of
homegrown terrorism, which has put Islam and Muslim Singapor-
eans in the spotlight. In the third part, I consider the confidence-
building initiatives at the national level, focusing on the Declaration
on Religious Harmony and the Community Engagement Program,
which seek to develop better ties and build confidence between dif-
ferent groups in Singapore. The fourth part then examines the
counter-radicalization efforts, centered on the Muslim community,
to fortify the Singapore polity against the insidious effects of reli-
gious extremism. The fifth part builds on the discussion in the first
part and explains the role and utility of the soft-law approach in the
overall institutional effort to deal with the terrorism threat. The cen-
tralityand fragilityof trust inengaging the racial andreligiousthreats
to public order and harmony are also explored. The sixth part con-
cludes the article.
Hard- and Soft-Law Approaches in Regulation
In an age where religious extremism is a real and potent national
security concern, public policy and legislation in a multireligious
society have to strive to reflect the value and belief systems of citi-
zens, including religious ones. This has to be inclusivewithnopartic-
ularsetof religiousbeliefsdiscriminatedorpreferred.Theregulatory
paradox lies in that, for the state to remain neutral and secular in a
multireligious polity, the state must regulate the religious realm as
a mediator and adjudicator in the socio-political arena. Because the
end goal of terrorists is to inflict terror and division on a community,
a society’s resilience and cohesion are vital. Coercive hard law is
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grossly inadequate inwinning the hearts andminds of a community.
Onthecontrary, amuscularand legalistic approach tocountering ter-
rorism, which characterized Singapore’s pre–9/11 approach, may
well play into the terrorists’ binary strategy of “us versus them.”
Soft-law instruments can reinforce the policy imperative in which
the growth of the common space need not be at the expense of
one’s religious identity and society’s religious diversity.7 Crucial to
the success of these efforts in winning the hearts and minds is
whether the regulatory practices and societal attitudes inculcate a
strong sense of the overarching common values and interests,
which in time may evolve into accepted norms. These values and
norms are a sustainable pathway toward uniting a plural society
around a common purpose as it seeks to protect itself against the
threat of social implosion by ensuring that the terrorist threat is not
distorted by a moral panic and societal fear through producing an
asymmetrical reaction within society. It recognizes the need for the
government to work with and through the communities.
Ground-up initiatives are therefore critical. The ultimate objective
is to create a safe, cohesive, and resilient society through imbibing a
sense of belonging, understanding, and appreciation of co-nationals
of other races, religions, and languages. Policymakers would do well
to note that soft-law approaches can have a protective function like
hard law and aid in the objective of reducing a society’s vulnerabili-
ties. There is less of a need to instill within the population acontinual
fear of terrorism, which inevitably strains the social fabric as well. To
be sure, vigilance is required, but fear is counter-productive. Going
forward, an even-handed mix of hard- and soft-law approaches in
managing the terrorism threat provides a good combination of regu-
lation, enforcement, and a basis for the inculcation of self-enforcing
values and norms.8
In response to the threat of terrorism, governments have arrogated
to themselves the availability of a variety of hard laws that they can
use to deal with clear and present danger that terrorism poses.9
Hard law is generally understood as “legally binding obligations
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the
7. Public space in Singapore is also often referred to as “common space.” Such
spaces are shared by all, regardless of affiliations. They are kept, to the fullest
extent possible, race- and religion-free or neutral so that Singaporeans are not
unnecessarily concerned or excluded from such spaces because of their subna-
tional identities or affiliations.
8. See further elaboration in Eugene K. B. Tan, “From Clampdown to Limited
Empowerment: Hard and Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of Religious
Conduct in Singapore,” Law and Policy 31 (July 2009): 351–79.
9. On thehard-lawcounterterrorismregime, see EugeneK.B. Tan, “Singapore,” in
Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law, ed. Kent Roach (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2015), 610–49.
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issuanceofdetailedregulations)andthatdelegateauthority for inter-
preting and implementing the law.”10 For example, antiterrorism leg-
islations stipulate—in varying degrees of clarity and precision—the
proscribed acts of commission and omission (obligations and com-
pliance), the imposition of legally binding duties and obligations
(accountability), and the punishment for transgression (sanctions).
Although the coercive powers of hard law are useful in clamping
down on real and present dangers, they also impose severe costs
and unintended consequences. Given the nature of the terrorist
threat as both existential and ideational, the structural power of
hard law is often not only reactionary but also grossly inadequate
as ameans of pre-emptive, adaptive socialization and social learning
prior to, during, and after a terrorist strike. Crucially, hard law does
not help engender a resilient society.
On the other hand, the soft-lawapproach is less definitive anddoes
not create enforceable rights and duties. With soft law popular
and used to good effect in the public international law arena, policy-
makers are increasinglyusing soft law indomestic settings as amode
of regulation, especially where preventive measures are useful. It
includes a variety of processes that attempt to set rules, guidelines,
or codes of conduct that share the common trait of having nonlegally
binding normative content that can have regulative, practical effects
similar to hard law. Because soft law cannot be enforced by legal
means, it cannotberelieduponasabasis fordeterrence, enforcement
action, and punitive sanctions. However, soft law is inherently flexi-
ble, possessing discursive power through its facilitative effort to
establish normative standards and enable social learning. It seeks
to reduce a harm,whether defined or even inchoate, through an anal-
ysis of risk and the development of appropriate norms and values
that involves relevant stakeholders. This is particularly useful in sit-
uations of flux where persuasion and reflexive adjustment, rather
than rigid adherence or enforcement, are needed.
The force of hard law lies in its deterrent power for thosemotivated
by a self-absorbed avoidance of punishment. However, radicals and
terrorists arenotdeterredbysuchmethods. Soft law’sprimary contri-
butionis increatingabehavioralregimeinvolvingthekeystakeholders
thatalsohasthebenefitofbeingfacilitativeofeffortsto internalizethe
normsembeddedinhard law.For instance, the ideationalstandardsor
10. Domestic legislation and international treaties are two tangible expressions
of hard law. See further Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance,” in Legalization andWorld Politics, ed. J. L. Gold-
stein, M. Kahler, R. O. Keohane and A.-M. Slaughter (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2011), 37. The discussion on the attributes of hard and soft laws in the remainder
of this section is largelydrawn fromTan, “FromClampdown to LimitedEmpower-
ment,” 355–57.
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expectations first enunciated in soft-law mechanisms can form the
basis on which the practical application of the hard law can subse-
quently acquire effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy. Soft law can
also be understood as law in the embryonic stage of formation (that
is, the precursor of emerging hard law) or as principles and norms
thatmight eventually consolidate and contribute to the legal interpre-
tation of hard law or become legally binding rules themselves. In this
regard, soft law can help knowledge, norms, and values to be framed
strategically and dovetail with existing normative frameworks. In
this, soft law’s strategic potential lies partly in its “soft power.”
Ratherthanresortingtothreats (inessence, theuseofhardlaw)orpay-
ments (bribes), soft power is the ability of a political entity to obtain
what it wants by virtue of it being an attractive model.11 In the
pursuit of racial and religious harmony in Singapore, the soft-law
approach is more likely to be seen as possessing legitimacy as it is
more likely to secure buy-in from societal stakeholders than
top-down governmental regulation would.
Specifically,soft-lawmechanismsindealingwiththeterrorismthreat
can be adapted for the purposes of winning the hearts and minds of
people by persuading the relevant stakeholders that extremism, vio-
lence, and conflict are not the solutions. In Singapore’s context, this
means the government can use soft law to attract, socialize, and incul-
cate in the citizenry the requisite norms to buttress the imperative of
ensuring that religion is not abused to sow discord, conflict, and vio-
lence.12 These attributes of soft law can facilitate the socialization of
desired behavioral norms, the formation of consensual knowledge,
and a shared understanding of the terrorist threat and the necessary
mindset and conduct to counter it.
Furthermore,soft lawcanalsopossesstheregulativeandconstrain-
ing effect of hard law. The utility of soft law instruments is its trans-
formative capacity in socializing stakeholders through a consensual
and confidence-building process. More directly, soft law speaks to
reasonandunderstanding, strivestodevelopconsensus, andencour-
ages the internalization of desired values and interests. Lawrence
Kohlberg’s stages of moral development help to demonstrate how
soft law’s iterative, quasi-prescriptive nature can engage cognitive
and informedresponses indevelopinganuancedregulative response
to a societal threat (see figure 1).13
11. Joseph Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York:
Public Affairs, 2004).
12. As the article will discuss, Singapore’s soft-law instruments bear the heavy
imprintofeitherbeinggovernment-initiated,government-endorsed,orgovernment-
driven even if civil society is inducted as well.
13. Lawrence Kohlberg, “Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-
Developmental Approach,”Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research,
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UsingKohlberg’smodel, ahard-lawapproach tendstoelicit reason-
ing and responses that are primarily egocentric, denominated in
self-centered terms of avoiding punishment, compliance with an
Figure 1 Kohlberg’s stages of moral development.
and Social Issues, ed. T. Lickona (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart, &Winston, 1976). I rec-
ognize that Kohlberg’s model has been criticized for its cultural and gender
biases. On the former, critics have contended that Kohlberg’s model may be cul-
turally biased for its emphasis on ideals found primarily in Western cultures,
suchas individual rights and social justice. In this article, Kohlberg’smodel is uti-
lized to illustrate how soft law’s iterative, quasi-prescriptive nature can engage
cognitive and informed responses in developing a nuanced regulative response
to a societal threat.
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authority, andgroupnorms (or, levels oneor twoofKohlberg’smoral
development). A soft-law approach, on the other hand, encourages
the movement toward a level-three moral development in which
a person is able to adopt a perspective that factors the interests
of affected parties based on impartial and reasonable principles.
When successfully imbibed, soft-law approaches result in society
being able to attain the postconventional stage of moral reasoning
in which critical and reflective reasoning are dominant. This exercis-
ing of moral suasion over the expected and desired conduct of a citi-
zenry, religious communities, and the government before, during,
and after a terrorist attack is a better means of ensuring that society
does not implode.
Althoughweshouldnotviewhardandsoft law inbinaryorantithet-
ical terms in dealing with the terrorism threat, it is crucial nonethe-
less to distinguish between (1) laws that seek to prevent terrorist
acts from taking place and (2) laws that seek to prevent a multiracial
society from imploding after a terrorist attack. The objectives of law
and policy differ for both courses of action, even though both
are interdependent and underline the cohesion of a society as a nec-
essary cooperative effort of various stakeholders. In preventing
terrorist acts from taking place, a hard-law approach focusing on
deterrence and sanctions would cohere with the preventative and
command-and-control objectives targeted at a recalcitrant few that
may also have the effect of marginalizing or even stigmatizing the
larger community.
In contrast, a regulatory framework that seeks to prevent a mul-
tiracial, multireligious society from imploding after a terrorist
attack has to emphasize and nurture a cooperative values-based
culture and norms that instill ethical conduct of the masses,
grounded in self-regulation, civic responsibility, and social resil-
ience. Here, the intention is to build understanding, confidence,
and trust. Hard law, however, cannot protect a society from nonra-
tional fears; it can only seek to suppress those fears, but there are
limits to this. Although soft law is no panacea either, it can help
build bridges of normative consensus and have communities inter-
nalize the values necessary to hold society together. Rather than
external regulation, Thio Li-ann argues that relational constitution-
alism, “which is concerned with preserving durable relationships
and cultivating tolerance and solidarity to preserve the quasi-
constitutional norm of ‘racial and religious harmony,’” can better
address inter-religious tensions by dialogue and persuasion. This
requires regulatory mechanisms going beyond rights to encompass
civic virtues such as duty, tolerance, sensitivity, common sense,
and forgiveness in serving the public good. Soft constitutional
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law is particularly relevant and useful in maintaining racial and
religious harmony.14
In Singapore, hardandsoft lawsareoftenused to complement each
other to enlarge thestate’s capacity to regulate aswell as socialize the
citizenry. The putative cooperative element of the soft law approach
can be deployed as a societal hedge against generalizedmistrust and
moral panic. The soft law approach pivots on the centrality of devel-
oping commitment to common values and ideals that all communi-
ties can identify with and use to guide their daily activities and
interactions. The soft law instruments often provide guidance and
elaborate on the interpretation of hard-law instruments. For soft
law to successfully engage civil society, the values embodied in
soft-law instruments must resonate with the intended audience.
Governmentsplayan instrumental role inensuring thatsuchvalues
are fortifiedagainst forcesthatundermine thecommonalities shared
byapolyglot societyand the commonhumanity thatbinds faith com-
munities.15 The overall deterrent effect of soft law derives from it
facilitating the development of the citizenry’s affective, emotional,
and cognitive abilities to deal with the myriad complex issues and
emotions that ethnic markers inflected by terrorism can arouse.16
The Faith Landscape—The Imperative of Harmony
Racial and religious harmony is one of Singapore’s five Shared
Values.17 Coexisting with the state’s professed commitment to secu-
larism, the state also acknowledges Singaporeans’ religious faith as a
major part of Singapore’s cultural ballast. Although secularism is a
cardinalprincipleofSingapore’spolitical governance, thegovernment
14. Thio Li-ann, “Relational Constitutionalism and the Management of Religious
Disputes: The Singapore ‘Secularism with a Soul’ Model,” Oxford Journal of Law
and Religion 1, no. 2 (2012): 446–69.
15. Studieson terrorismandextremismhaveoftenpointed to the intractable and
endemicconflictsbetweenstateandnonstateactorsover the lackofequal citizen-
ship and thepowerwieldedbysuch actors. See, for example,MahmoodMamdani,
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2004); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Net-
works (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); and Olivier Roy,
Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004). I am grateful to a reviewer for emphasizing this.
16. A government media campaign in 2007 sought to reinforce the notion that
Singapore’s security and unity is a “shared mission for all.” The tender notice
(on filewithauthor) statedthat theadvertisingcampaignshouldaimto“influence
public perceptions at the broad ideological and psychological level, providing an
emotive context to an understanding of Singapore’s security environment.”
17. Officially adopted in 1993, the Shared Values aim to consolidate the cultural
essence of Singapore’s multiracial society and contribute to Singapore’s long-
term growth as a distinctive Asian nation.
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recognizes that religion and politics are not distinct spheres of influ-
ence and experience. It appreciates that religions tend to encompass
comprehensive worldviews on all dimensions of human existence
and are a powerful instrument to rally faith communities as well as
a potential tool of protest against socioeconomic and political injus-
tices,perceivedor real.18EvenastheSingaporeanstate strivestokeep
religion and politics distinct and separate, it is also pragmatically
alive to the fact that maintaining a watertight separation between
these two realms is neither realistic nor sustainable. Yet, Singapore
is not a dogmatic secular state. The government is fully cognizant
of the power of religion tomobilize, tomotivate, to enforce behavior,
values, andnorms among the faithful. The government has also part-
neredwithreligiousgroups in thesocial servicessector.Thisbrandof
pragmatic and accommodative secularism has served Singapore
well.19
In some respects, this pragmatic attitude toward religion reflects
flexibility and responsiveness to the role of religion in Singaporean
society. Rapid modernization in Singapore has not resulted in an
apparentdecline in the importanceof religiousbeliefs, and thedown-
grading of importance of religious institutions (the secularization
thesis) does not appear to be borne out in Singapore. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests a revivalism across all major faiths. While Singapor-
eans’ increased religiosity per se is not a concern, it would be of
concern to the government should Singaporeans interact less with
Singaporeans of other faiths. Given its open economy and the ubiq-
uityofnewmediaaccess, Singapore is invariablyexposedtothetrans-
national phenomena of the rise of religious fundamentalism,
powerful transnational associational pulls of renewed religiosity,
and new forms of post-traditional/new age spirituality.20
18. See, for example, Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after
September 11 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
19. See further, EugeneK. B. Tan, “KeepingGod in Place: TheManagement of Reli-
gion in Singapore,” in Religious Diversity in Singapore, ed. Lai Ah Eng (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Institute of Policy Studies, National Uni-
versity of Singapore, 2008), 55–82.
20. Since 9/11, religious fundamentalism across all faiths has been subjected to
closer scrutiny by governments globally. On the global impact of fundamental-
ism, see Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Reli-
gion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003); Gerrie ter Haar and James J. Busuttil, eds., The Freedom to
Do God’s Will: Religious Fundamentalism and Social Change (London: Routledge,
2003). On these developments, including the misuse of religion to morally
justify terrorism and the rise of religious terrorism as a political force, see gener-
ally Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Martin E. Marty,
“Our Religio-secular World,” Daedalus 132, no. 3 (2003): 42–48; Pippa Norris
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In response, the Singaporegovernmentmaintains awatchful eyeon
external influences, and is prepared to move preemptively against
any perceived threat to social cohesion and harmony.21 The govern-
ment operates from the conservative and realist premise that racial
and religious harmony cannot be taken for granted and that efforts
have to be continually exerted to ensure that moderation and social
responsibility prevails in the practice of one’s faith. As such, the gov-
ernment seeks to keep the realms of politics and religion as separate
anddistinctaspossible even if Singaporeansdonotdrawthatdistinc-
tion emphatically. In the last three decades, the religious identifier as
part of a Singaporean’s identity has become even more prominent.
Although it would be misleading to equate increased religiosity of
the Malay Muslims with Islamism (understood here as a political
ideology supportive of Muslim political activism), the government’s
concern with the Malay Muslim way of life in recent years is all
butapparent.Theoverarchingfearandabidingsenseofvulnerability,
mademore pronounced since the post–September 11 so-called “war
on terror,” ensure that close scrutiny, interventionist surveillance,
and ultra-sensitivity to internal security concerns are hallmarks of
the government’s policy toward religion and the terrorism threat.
Singaporeans’ religious affiliation has remained relatively stable
over the last twenty-fiveyears.Further, religiousandracialgrouprela-
tions, pre– and post–September 11, 2001, are positive.22 Buddhists
(33.3%) constitute the largest religious group, followed by Muslims
(14.7%), no religion (17.0%), Christians (18.3%), Taoists (10.9%), and
Hindus (5.1%).23BuddhismandChristianity inSingaporehaveexperi-
enced substantial growth in the last twenty-five years with better-
educated Chinese more inclined toward Christianity. There is an
emergent pattern of Christians being of “relatively higher social-
economic status (in education, occupation, and income) and exerting
an influence, politically, socially, and economically, far greater than
the number they represent in the population.”24
and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
21. Michael Hill, “The Rehabilitation and Regulation of Religion in Singapore,” in
Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, ed. James Richardson
(New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004), 343–58.
22. SeeDavidChan, Surveyon Social Attitudes of Singaporeans: Attitudes onRace
and Religion (Singapore: Ministry of Community Development and Sports, 2002
and 2003).
23. Figures are for residents (citizens and permanent residents) in Singapore;
taken from the 2010 national census.
24. Eddie C. Y. Kuo, Jon S. T. Quah, and Tong Chee Kiong, Religion and Religious
Revivalism in Singapore (Singapore: Ministry of Community Development,
1988), 11.
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For theminority indigenousMalay community, racial and religious
identities are not only simultaneously prominent but also conflated.
Because 99.6 percent of Malay Singaporeans profess Islam, the gov-
ernmentregardsMalayssynonymouslyasMuslims.TheMuslimiden-
tity is treated as an integral, if not inalienable, part of the Malay
identity. This double and interchangeable identities, “Malay/
Muslim” inofficial Singaporediscourse,distinguishestheMalaycom-
munity and emphasizes their distinctiveness vis-a`-vis the non-
Malays. Within the community itself, it also nurtures a greater com-
munity self-consciousness of the double bond of race and faith.25
This conflation of racial and religious identities constrains the full
integration of Malay/Muslims in the Singapore Armed Forces and
other security agencies. This stems from the government’s concern
that, in the event of a conflict with its predominantly Muslim neigh-
bors, primordial loyalties of ethnicity and religion will trump the
civic and secular loyalties to the Singaporean nation.26 This threat
assessment is a significant, if latent, bone of contention between
the government and the Muslim community.
Although it is misleading to equate the increased religiosity of
the Muslim Singaporean community as sympathy with or support
for the violent strand of Islamism, the government has always been
concerned that primordial loyalties of faith and ethnicity would
take precedence over civic and secular loyalties to the Singapore
nation-state.27 In particular, the government’s concern with the per-
ceived, growing exclusivity of the Malay Muslim community was
amplified with the discovery of homegrown Islamist terrorist sus-
pects since 9/11.28 This latent but persistent fear of Muslims as a
Trojanhorsehasbeenheightenedsince9/11, in tandemwith Islamist
terrorism being regularly assessed as a real, multifaceted, and
25. Consequently, there is a top-down enforced reduction of individual and sub-
group differences within the Malay Muslim community and the convenient ten-
dency to treat it as a monolithic entity.
26. On the “Trojan horse” dilemma in Singapore’s national service system, see
Alon Peled, A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), ch. 3. See also the critique of the “cul-
turalist approach” in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Issues on Islam and the
Muslims in Singapore Post–9/11: An Analysis of the Dominant Perspective,” in
Encountering Islam: The Politics of Religious Identities in Southeast Asia, ed. Hui
Yew-Foong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 335–75.
27. My use of “increased religiosity” in this article should not be understood as
suggesting that prior to the 1980s, Muslim Singaporeans were not religious or
not as religious as they are today. Instead, I use the term to describe changes in
Muslim religious expressions such as dietary practices, dressing, and other reli-
gious observances that have becomemore pronounced since the 1980s.
28. MinistryofHomeAffairs,The Jemaah IslamiyahArrests and theThreat of Ter-
rorism, White Paper Cmd 2 of 2003, presented to Parliament by command of the
Presidentof theRepublic of Singapore (Singapore:MinistryofHomeAffairs, 2003).
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strategic threat in Singapore’s locale in Southeast Asia.29 This was
furtheraccentuatedby theWashingtonBeltway’spreviouslyexagger-
ated concerns over terrorism in archipelagic Southeast Asia as the
“second front” in the “global war against terror.”30
Religious issues pertaining to Islam in Singapore continue to
present specific challenges to the government and are regularly pro-
filed in the official discourse. From the 1990s onwards, given the
strong accent of Islamic revivalism globally, including in Indonesia
andMalaysia,31 the Singapore government paid even closer attention
to the religious dimension of the Malay Muslim community life.
In particular, the apparent re-Islamization in daily life—not just
outward behavior but also inward attitudes and values—led to
the government’s primary concern of the potential formation of a
closedMalayMuslim community. In contrast, theMalayMuslim com-
munity’s self-perception is that its increased religiosity stems from a
spiritual self-renewal rather than the insistence of a particularized
Islamic systemofvalues andethics or vulnerability towardamilitant,
violentbrandof jihadism. Theverydifferentperceptionsof increased
religious piety make the management of the terrorism threat chal-
lenging.
In the current security climate, increased Muslim religiosity and
expression of conservatism have become securitized.32 Simply put,
the terrorist threat from within is an explicitly national security
issue, with Muslim Singaporeans’ apparent susceptibility to radical
and militant Islam being the key concern. Ever since the September
29. Peter Chalk and Carl Ungerer, Neighborhood Watch: The Evolving Terrorist
Threat in Southeast Asia (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute,
2008); Sidney Jones, “Briefing for theNewPresident: TheTerrorist Threat in Indo-
nesia and Southeast Asia,” Annals (AAPSS) 618 (2008): 69–78.
30. The US State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report for
2003 describes Southeast Asia as “an attractive theater of support and logistics”
for Al-Qaida. The report is available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/
2003 accessed on April 30, 2004. See also John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia
the Second Front?” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (2002): 60–74.
31. On Islamic revivalism in Indonesia and Malaysia, see Greg Fealy, “Islam in
Southeast Asia: Domestic Pietism, Diplomacy and Security,” in Contemporary
Southeast Asia: Regional Dynamics, National Differences, ed. Mark Beeson
(NewYork: PalgraveMacmillan,2004), 136–55;RobertW.HefnerandPatriciaHor-
vatich, eds., Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and Religious Renewal in
Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997); Michael
Laffan, “The Tangled Roots of Islamist Activism in Southeast Asia,” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs 16, no. 3 (October 2003): 397–414; Peter
G. Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses
(London: Hurst & Co., 2001).
32. On the process of securitization, see Alan Collins, Security and Southeast
Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003),
5–8.
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11,2001, attacksand thewar inAfghanistanand Iraq, Islamhascome
under even more scrutiny globally, Singapore included. Between the
end of 2001 and early 2002, there were several rounds of arrests
and detention of JI and “self-radicalized” terrorist suspects in Singa-
pore. Against the backdropof theU.S.-led “global waragainst terror,”
thesearrestsof “home-grown” terrorist suspectsunsettled theSinga-
porean polity, with anecdotal evidence then suggesting that ethnic
relations were strained, if not shrouded in suspicion. Then Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew observed:
In keeping with a world-wide trend, over the last three decades many
Muslims in Singapore and the region are becoming stricter in their dress,
diet, religiousobservances, andevensocial interaction, especiallywithnon-
Muslims. Increasingly Muslim women will not shake hands with men.
The generation of convivial and easy-to-get-along-with Muslim leaders in
the region has given way to successors who observe a stricter Islamic
code of conduct. My original concern was over the growing separateness
of our Muslim community, as Singaporean Muslims tended to congregate
for their social and extra-mural activities in their mosques, instead of in
multi-racial community clubs. What came as a shock was that this height-
ened religiosity facilitated Muslim terror groups linked to Al-Qaeda to
recruit Singapore Muslims into their network.33
Muslim Singaporeans were themselves confronted by self-doubt
and ambivalence. The backdrop of the government’s apprehensions
over the loyaltyofMuslimSingaporeanstoSingapore,a long-standing
issue, reflecteda legacyofa lackofmutual trust.At thesametime, the
tudung/hijab (headscarf) controversy of 2002 unfolded and added
to thestrainedpolitical atmosphere.34 In2002,122Muslimorganiza-
tionscametogether, as “amatterof conscienceandnational concern”
and publicly condemned terrorism as being at odds with Islam.35
Thegovernmenthadexpressed its fearsof theMuslimcommunity’s
perceived exclusion and self-segregation from Singaporean society
on religious grounds. The government also worried about the
33. Lee Kuan Yew, Speech for the 1st Munich Economic Summit, Munich, June 7,
2002 (my emphasis). See further Lee’s views quoted inMikeMillard, Jihad in Par-
adise: IslamandPolitics inSoutheastAsia (Armonk,NY:M.E.Sharpe,2004),80–88.
34. The issueatstakewaswhetherMuslimpre-pubescent femalestudentsshould
be permitted to wear the tudung in national primary schools. The students were
suspended from school as their parents insisted on their daughters wearing the
tudung in school. The Education Ministry explained that school uniforms
reduced exclusiveness and promoted integration by sidelining differentiation
on the basis of race, religion, or class. See also Rahman, “Issues on Islam and
the Muslims in Singapore Post–9/11,” 347–55.
35. See “SingaporeMuslimOrganizationsDecryTerrorism inNameof Islam:Oct.
9 Statement Urges Singaporeans to Unite against Terrorism,” http://www.
america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/October/20021011151324larocque@
pd.state.gov0.9141504.html.
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negative impact the JI arrests would have on Singapore’s multiracial
andmultireligious society. Unfortunately, these legitimate concerns
were accompanied by unrelenting and uninformed public scrutiny
over the tenabilityof Islamicpracticesand increasedreligiosity inSin-
gapore, including questions over the overt symbols and signs of
Muslim identity and beliefs, which hitherto did not arouse concern.
In the January 2003 parliamentary debate on the “The Jemaah Islam-
iyahArrests and theThreatofTerrorism”whitepaper, thediscussion
of the terrorist threat was revealing and notable for the articulation
of a subtlemoral panic that obliquely linked increased Islamic religi-
osity and perceived Malay Muslim separateness with increased sus-
ceptibility toward terrorism. The official articulation highlighted
the concernwithMuslims’ supposed exclusionary practices and self-
segregation and the formation of an isolated “micro-community”
accompanied by the unilateral closing of common space. During
this period, the minister in-charge of Muslim affairs remarked:
Practices of the Malay community, which have evolved naturally, became
the subject of scrutiny. There was even some questioning as to whether
these practices were desirable or otherwise. . . . The local context did not
matteraswewere swathedwith excitingstories of terrorismandextremism
prefaced by the word “Islamic” supplied by overnight experts. There were
increased concerns and questions about the implications of overt symbols
and signs of Muslim identity and beliefs. Some wondered why Muslims
needed to consume food that was halal (or permitted) as though it was
a radical behavioral departure. Observing religions practices became a
short of shorthand for hovering at the edge of terrorism.36
Such a state of affairs was clearly unsatisfactory.37 The government
realized that a different approach was needed.
Building Confidence: National Initiatives
The stark realization that interracial ties were not as healthy as they
should be prompted the government to chart new directions to
engender better interethnic understanding. In the heightened
post–9/11 environment, the government was concerned that the
social fabric, although strong, may not withstand the grievous
impactofaterroristattack inSingapore. In theaftermathofaterrorist
attack in Singapore, social resentment and religious insecurity can
36. Yaacob Ibrahim, Speech by the minister for community development and
sports and minister in-charge of Muslim affairs at the Wee Kim Wee seminar on
Cross-Cultural Understanding, Singapore Management University, August 2,
2003.
37. See insightful discussion on the overemphasis on the theological dimension
of terrorism in Rahman, “Issues on Islam and the Muslims in Singapore
Post–9/11.”
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easily be unleashed through stereotyping, doubt, and prejudice. The
pathway to hatred and violencewas not unlikely if therewas a chasm
as to how to deal with the threats posed by terrorism. Increasingly
cognizant that a coercive legal arsenal has its limitations, the govern-
mentmovedcarefully toclothe theconceptof tolerance inamore tan-
gible manner. The initial national confidence-building efforts took
two principal forms: the rapid formation of the Inter-Racial Confi-
dence Circles (IRCCs, nowknown as Inter-Racial and Religious Confi-
dence Circles) in January 2002 at the constituency level across the
island and the unveiling of the Declaration on Religious Harmony
(DRH) in June 2003.
In stating the perimeters of religious conduct that is deemedmoder-
ate and nonthreatening, the DRH, available in four official languages,
was a government-led initiative to educate and engage civil society
on the acceptable norms in the practice of one’s faith.38 Previous
efforts to this end focused on the religious elites. Although the DRH
is a nonlegislative, nonenforceable document, the government-led
efforts to craft a code of conduct were an attempt to exert moral
suasion on the religious leaders and believers alike to practicemoder-
ation in their faiths, fully sensitive to the multireligious realities and
secular constraints inherent in the Singapore polity. The notion of tol-
eranceneededtobeunpackedso that therulesofreligiousconductare
clearly laid out, shared, and understood by Singaporeans. With time,
these principles could be internalized anddevelop into socio-political
norms thatwould strengthen the secular andmultireligious character
of Singapore.
Although the first draft of the DRH39was provided by the state and
subsequentlyworkedonbyselected religious elites, the intentwas to
induct one segment of civil society (namely, the religious elites) in
generating consensus and buy-in on the ground rules. The drafting
process of the DRH is also insightful. Led by a junior minister and a
committeeofparliamentariansofvarious faiths, thevariousnational
bodies of all major religious groups in Singapore were consulted on
38. The DRH reads: “We, the people in Singapore, declare that religious harmony
is vital for peace, progress and prosperity in our multi-racial and multi-religious
Nation. We resolve to strengthen religious harmony through mutual tolerance,
confidence, respect, and understanding. We shall always
- Recognise the secular nature of our State,
- Promote cohesion within our society,
- Respect each other’s freedom of religion,
- Grow our common space while respecting our diversity,
- Foster inter-religious communications,
and thereby ensure that religion will not be abused to create conflict and dishar-
mony in Singapore.”
39. The DRH was originally titled the “Code of Religious Harmony.”
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the draft. The discussion was initially conducted with the religious
bodies individually. Inputs from the public were received through
letters, e-mails, and themedia. The adhocworking groupdeliberated
between October 2002 and February 2003. Subsequently, a revised
draft was prepared, and representatives of all of the religious
bodies reviewed the draft as a group. The draft was then submitted
to the Inter-Racial Confidence Circle National Steering Committee,
before final submission to the government in February 2003.
Mindful of the sensitivities, the DRH working committee consulted
all major religious groups in Singapore.40 In June 2003, the DRH
wasunveiled, atangiblemanifestationof thefledglingattemptatcon-
cretizing the guiding principles from which consensus and confi-
dence building, as well as norm building, can evolve.41
Prior totheDRH,severalprinciplesofresponsible religiousconduct
were first articulated in the “Maintenance of Religious Harmony”
White Paper in the late 1980s.42 Although the focus of the parliamen-
tary document was on the religious elites, the White Paper also
reminded religious communities to exercise moderation and toler-
ance and to keep religion and politics as separate fields of human
endeavor.43 However, the government had then decided against a
similarguidelinesapproachbecause it felt that itwouldbe ineffective
against a minority who would disregard a list of dos and don’ts.
Instead, it preferred a hard-law approach and proceeded to enact
the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. In contrast, the DRH
expands on the White Paper and lays out for all faith believers the
general principles without being unduly prescriptive. Bearing in
mind thepurposeof theobjectiveofpublic educationandconfidence
building, the avoidance of formalistic rules in preference for over-
arching principles and guidelines is a better approach.
40. The representatives came from the following faiths: Baha’i, Buddhism, Chris-
tianity,Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism,Sikhism,Taoism, andZoroastrianism.
41. See further, Thio Li-ann, “Constitutional ‘Soft’ Law and the Management of
Religious Liberty andOrder: The 2003Declaration of ReligiousHarmony,” Singa-
pore Journal of Legal Studies (2004): 414–43. See also Tan, “From Clampdown to
Limited Empowerment,” 363–65.
42. Maintenance of Religious Harmony, White Paper Cmd 21 of 1989, presented
to Parliament by command of the President of the Republic of Singapore (Singa-
pore: National Printers, 1989).
43. The White Paper also set out proposals for legislation to maintain religious
tolerance andharmony in Singapore and for the establishment of the Presidential
Council for ReligiousHarmony. TheMaintenance ofReligiousHarmonyActwas a
legislative product of the White Paper. For a reflection on this “groundbreaking
piece of legislation” by the then home affairs minister, see S. Jayakumar, Be at
the Table or Be on the Menu: A Singapore Memoir (Singapore: Straits Times
Press, 2015), 112–14.
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The DRH drafting process had the salutary effect of assuring the
various faith communities of their role and presence in Singaporean
society. Again, theDRHdemonstrated the importance of a consultative
and consensual process in dealing with matters of faith. More impor-
tant, the DRH has crystallized the substantive norms on religious
harmony and religious freedom in the Singaporean context for the
faith communities’ elites and followers alike.44 Following the adoption
of theDRH, the Inter-ReligiousHarmony Circle, consisting of represen-
tativesof allmajor faiths involved in theDRHconsultationprocess,was
formally established to build on the interfaith dialogue established in
theearlierconsultationsanddiscussions.Theretentionofthisgrouping
ofreligiouselitesasaconsultationforumtoguideeffortstopromotethe
spirit of theDRHunderlines the belief that theDRHneeds to be a living
document inwhich thenormsandvaluesarepracticed in formandsub-
stance. The government has also urged religious bodies and schools to
recite the DRH annually on Racial Harmony Day (July 21).
The Community Engagement Program
The state continues to assert itself as an indispensable intermediary
in facilitating better inter-racial and inter-religious understanding.
This ensures that the government continues to exert a measure of
control and influence over issuesof race and religion. Suchadevelop-
ment is not surprising. The state’s dominance in ethnic relations,
through its top-down approach, has affected the nature of inter-racial
and inter-religious understanding. Genuine interethnic understand-
ing cannot be engendered by artificially induced interactions. Yet the
abiding unease and fear that social cohesion and resilience is fragile
prompted the government to explore othermeans of enhancing inter-
ethnic relations. In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, especially by
homegrown perpetrators, the primary concern for policymakers is
thepotentialbacklashagainst theMuslimcommunityandtheunravel-
ing of Singapore’s social fabric. This overriding fear took on added
urgency following the 7/7 London bombings by homegrown British
perpetrators in July 2005.
The prime minister had acknowledged that the multifaceted chal-
lenges posed by the post–9/11 security environment is “by far the
most serious [security problem] that we have faced since the commu-
nistproblem.”45Moresignificant,sincethelatterhalfof2005,thechar-
acterizationof the terrorist threathasmovedaway fromthesomewhat
44. Arguably, the Singapore courts could take cognizance of theDRH in constitu-
tional litigation involving the constitutional right to religious freedom and the
ambit of the right to profess, practice, and propagate one’s faith.
45. “Not the Terror, but the Fallout,” 1–2.
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overindulgent,exclusive,andunenlightening focusonthe“right,mod-
erate Islam.” There is now official recognition that maintaining social
cohesion and resilience requires a two-way interactive process at
various levels: between state and civil society, between political and
religious elites, between religious elites and their followers, between
elites and followers of the various faiths.46 In the clearest demonstra-
tion of the need for Muslims and non-Muslims to take collective
responsibility, invest, and be engaged in enhancing social cohesion,
the primeminister issued a timely corrective:
[W]emustknowthatthis [terrorism] isnotaMalay-Muslimproblem.This isa
national problemandnon-Muslimsalsohave toplay yourpart, forexample,
by preserving the space for minorities in the majority-Chinese society by
upholding the ideals of meritocracy and equal opportunity and treatment,
regardless of race, language and religion and by clearly distinguishing the
small numberof extremistswhoareathreat tous fromthemajorityofmod-
erate, rational, loyal Muslim Singaporeans with whomwework together to
tackle a shared problem.47
It was in this context that the Community Engagement Program (CEP)
was launched in February 2006.48 The CEP is now the centerpiece of
the endeavor to ensure that Singapore has adequate social capital
and social resilience to withstand threats to its social fabric posed
by terrorist acts. The CEP seeks to widen and deepen the linkages
among Singaporeans at multiple levels by involving more people
through bottom-up initiatives for civil society ownership and build-
ing on the networks developed by the IRCCs.
Before the CEP’s launch, the public discourse of the terrorist threat
was inflected with a palpable moral panic that linked increased
Islamic religiosity and perceived Malay Muslim separateness with
increased susceptibility toward terrorism. The key challenge since
9/11 is to adeptlymanage theMalayMuslimSingaporeans’ increased
religiosity and their perception of being under siege, as well as the
non-Muslim apprehension, fears, and misunderstanding of Islam
and Muslim Singaporeans. The latest emphasis on reaching out to
the “Muslim civil society” seeks tomanage the perceived exclusivism
within the Malay Muslim community.49 This outreach is a subset of
46. In this article, “resilience” is understood broadly as society’s ability to resist
violent extremism. It also includes the ability of a society to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from a terrorist attack.
47. SpeechbyPrimeMinisterLeeHsienLoongat theCommunityEngagementPro-
gramme Dialogue, February 9, 2006. (Emphasis mine)
48. See theCEPportal, “SingaporeUnited”athttp://www.singaporeunited.sg. See
also SingaporeUnited: TheCEP Journey2006–2008 (Singapore:MinistryofHome
Affairs CEP Secretariat, 2009).
49. I use the term “Muslim civil society” for the community of believers of Islam,
includingthereligiousteachersandleaders.AlthoughIslamdoesnotseparate the
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the larger ongoing attempt to involve and engage civil society in
dealing with religious extremism, ignorance, and prejudice through
regular interfaith dialogue, confidence building, and the establish-
ment of desired norms in the practice of one’s faith.
The CEP mobilizes Muslim and non-Muslim communities to work
together in tackling the terrorist threat.50 Tolerance, manifested in
the “live and let live” dictum, is inadequate. Although draconian leg-
islation may be apt in the event of a crisis, such legislation does not
assist in the building of interethnic ties during peaceful conditions.
Nordoes it help society to get backon its feet in the aftermathof a ter-
rorist attack. Enforcing draconian legislation is reactionarywith little
didactic and normative value. The Singapore government believes in
the utility and necessity of coercive legislation. It also emphasizes
that theMuslim community practices its faith in the context of amul-
tiracial societywithmoderationas thedefining attribute. But the gov-
ernment is also aware that legislation alone is grossly insufficient in
keeping thedeleteriouseffectsofviolent radicalismandsocial conse-
quences of a terrorist attack at bay.
Initiatives and Endeavors in Counter-Radicalization
EvenasthegovernmentdescribedtheDRHandCEPascivil society–led
nationwide endeavors, therewas also the impetus tohave community-
led efforts. Congruentwith the “pre-emptive strike” (“nip the problem
in the bud”) governance philosophy that is the hallmark of the Singa-
pore government in security matters, this urgent and renewed push
toward the forging of national resilience in the new security environ-
ment entails that the government engage civil society as a partner
and stakeholder. This whole-of-society push is the objective even as
the whole-of-government approach is still the dominant strand in the
counter-terrorism narrative and strategy.
In the battle of ideas and for the hearts andminds of believers, civil
society has a key role to facilitate thedevelopment of overlapping con-
sensusonthenatureandcontentofreligiousconduct inasecular,mul-
tiracial society. Inparticular, thecentralityofcivil societyreiteratesthe
religious fromthesocio-political realms, it ispossible toconceiveof thefaithfulas
constituting thespacebetweenstateandfamily inasecular state. It is in this space
where society resides andwhere the Islamic faith community debates andnegoti-
ates with the Singaporean state (whether through MUIS or not) on matters con-
cerning their faith and state policies. The Muslim civil society is, of course, not
monolithic.
50. See the CEP’s “Singapore United” portal at http://www.singaporeunited.sg.
See also Asad-ul Iqbal Latif,Hearts of Resilience: Singapore’s Community Engage-
ment Programme (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011).
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fact that the state cannot unilaterally impose its view on a faith com-
munity’s desired practices. Instead, it highlights the patent need for
and commitment to dialogue, cooperation, and trust. Various efforts
to engage civil society, particularly the Muslim community, stem
from the overarching themes of promotingmoderation and a distinc-
tive Muslim Singaporean identity as a bulwark against religious-
inspiredterrorism.Inparticular, thisconcertedeffort towardengaging
the Muslim community, albeit through the MUIS as the dominant
interlocutor, authorizes the promotion of an autochthonous practice
of Islam.51Emphasis isplacedonreligiousmoderation, a sensitive rec-
ognition of Singapore’s multiracialism, and the need for the Muslim
private space not to encroach onto or reduce the common space. The
promotion of Islamic moderation and inter-religious understanding
is buttressed by the central concerns of social cohesion and religious
tolerance.
Following the JI arrests, the initial characterization of the terrorist
threat facingMuslimSingaporeanswasoneof “radical versusmoder-
ate” Islamand the imperativeof the “moderatepath.”52Moderation is
understood to mean that Muslims ought not interpret and practice
Islam narrowly and rigidly. It also requires Muslims to speak up
against co-religionists who advocate intolerance and extremism to
ensure that these views did not gain legitimacy and currency by
default as a consequence of the silence of the moderate majority.
Mindful that the fateof terrorist ideology lieswith theMuslimcommu-
nity, the Singapore government, throughMUIS, advocates the need for
a “moderate, mainstream Muslim” community. The government’s
clarion call is for Muslim Singaporeans to inoculate themselves and
their community against radical ideologies while undermining the
theological legitimacyof thebeliefsandactionsespousedbyterrorists
and radicals.53 Although the public discourse retains the self-limiting
and unenlightening trope of moderate versus radical Islam, a parallel
51. Toreiterate,MUIS isastatutoryboardtaskedwithregulatingMuslimreligious
affairs and toadvise thegovernment inmatters relating to Islam. Forafurtherdis-
cussion of the points raised in this section, especially MUIS’ effort to forge a dis-
tinctive Muslim-Singaporean identity, see Tan, “From Clampdown to Limited
Empowerment,” 366–68.
52. But see the longitudinal national Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans,
which indicated thatMuslimSingaporeans are “moderate” in their religious views
and practice of their faith.
53. In discussing multiculturalism as a necessity and a constitutionally
entrenched obligation, the then Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong also supported
themoderationdiscourse: “Therecommendedsolution isnot tooutcast it [funda-
mentalist Islam], but to moderate it”; see the chief justice’s speech, “Culture and
Legal Practice,” presented at the International Bar Association Conference Show-
case Session, Singapore, November 15, 2007.
247
Soft Law and the Development of Norms and Trust
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jcs/article-abstract/59/2/226/2805464
by Singapore Management University user
on 16 November 2017
focus is on a broad-based, community approach in advancing inter-
religious tolerance, understanding, and confidence.
This unrelenting emphasis on moderation is intimately connected
with the urgency to mold the Muslim Singaporean identity as one
that is not only congruent with accepted Islamic values but also in
sync with progressive attributes of Singaporean society. In MUIS’s
February 16, 2007 sermon, moderation was explained in the follow-
ing manner:
Wemustunderstandand internalize these twoprinciples [Ath-Thawabit, or
those that are fixed and unchangeable forever, and Al-Mutaghaiyirat, or
those that can be changed and suited for different times and place]. Only
by understanding it can we avoid from being extremists who interpret
Islam from a very narrow viewpoint. And by understanding them, we can
also avoid from (sic) slipping into the path of liberal interpretation of
Islam. This is the moderation that Islam wants. Make this moderation our
way of life. Make this moderation as an identity for our community.
Because only on this moderation will our community be an example to
others, a community of just and be (sic) a witness to others.54
Likewise, MUIS has mobilized mosques to engage Muslim youths
to reduce their susceptibility to extremist ideology. Youth develop-
ment officers are deployed in mosques to offer mentoring and
befriender services to youths. The overarching aim is to encourage
Muslim youths to embrace a path of rationality and moderation in
their socio-religious life with emphasis on personal and social
responsibility.
Singapore Muslim Identity Project
To this end, the MUIS actively promotes the Singapore Muslim Iden-
tity (SMI) as encapsulating the moderate dimension of the Islamic
faith for a Muslim Singaporean. MUIS embarked on the SMI project
in early 2005 to impress upon Muslim Singaporeans the need for an
autochthonous Muslim Singaporean identity and way of life. Such a
“religiously profound” and “socially progressive” identity is contex-
tualized to the prevailing socio-political and economic environment.
This is now embodied in the “ten desired attributes” of Singapore’s
“Muslim community of excellence” (see figure 2). These attributes
ostensibly seek to help Muslim Singaporeans understand their dual
roles and identities as Muslims and citizens.
Through the SMI, MUIS promotes the practice of Islam in Singapore
as one that is cognizant of the religious pluralismwithin the context
of a secular state. By concretizing the virtues and aspirational norms
54. This MUIS sermon was titled “Forging the Singapore Muslim Identity.”
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of a Muslim Singaporean, the SMI is an endeavor to craft a desired
Islamic Singaporean identity that will not be overwhelmed by the
appeals of competing and disparate Muslim ideas and identities
imported from overseas, notwithstanding Islam’s Arabic roots and
continuing influence. The nuanced message is that Muslims are not
being forced into a false choice betweenbeingMuslimsandSingapor-
eans. This conscious amplification of a unique Singaporean Muslim
identityurgesthe recognition that there isno fundamental incompat-
ibility of Singaporean and Muslim identities.
The promotion of the SMI predates 9/11 and should be seen as an
integral part of the government’s effort to grow the common space.
At that time, the government noted that growing Muslim religiosity
could pose problems if it resulted in its segregation and exclusion
from the larger society. The SMI seeks to pre-empt the inevitable
contestation anddoubtswithin theMuslim communityover national
identity and religious identity by asserting that both identities are
complementary and not mutually exclusive. Such exhortatory
efforts are to be welcomed, although the messaging needs to be
extended to the non-Muslim community. For the true demonstration
that Muslim Singaporeans can be confident of their place in
Figure 2 Ten desired attributes of Singapore’s Muslim community of excel-
lence (with respect to socio-religious life).
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Singaporean society is to ensure that discrimination on grounds of
raceor religion, however subtle, is not tolerated. Keygovernmentpol-
iciesmust be congruentwith efforts at social cohesion. So long as the
perceptions and/or vestiges of suspicion of the Malay Muslim com-
munity persist, the pathways toward inclusion, cohesion, and resil-
ience will be problematic and contested.55
Mosques have been tasked to engage Muslim youths and reduce
their susceptibility to extremist ideology. Youth development offi-
cers are deployed inmosques to offer mentoring and befriender ser-
vicestoyouths.TheoverarchingaimistoencourageMuslimyouthsto
embrace a path of rationality andmoderation in their socio-religious
life with emphasis on personal and social responsibility.56 MUIS’s
wide-ranging efforts in this regard remind us of the late Clifford
Geertz’s prescient observation that global Islam was “losing defini-
tion and gaining energy.”57
Muslim civil society efforts to counter radical and violent Islamist
ideology are also more evident in the past decade. Of note is the Reli-
gious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) formed in 2003 and comprising
some thirty ustaz (Islamic scholars) who have provided voluntary reli-
giousand rehabilitationcounseling aspart of theoverall rehabilitation
process to the JI detainees and their families to correct theirmisinter-
pretationof Islam.58AlongsideMUIS and otherMuslimorganizations,
the RRGhas reachedout to the public to explain themisuse and abuse
of Islamic teachings andconceptsby terrorists. To counter theextrem-
ist exploitation of religion, governmental efforts are grossly inade-
quate. It is of little surprise therefore that the Muslim religious elites,
with their authority, scholarship, and standing, are assiduously
inducted in the effort not to cede themiddle ground to the radicals.
Engendering Norms in Secular and Religious Realms
Giventhat terrorismisanasymmetric threat, amultifacetedresponse
that is cognizant of the societal complexities inherent in a multicul-
tural polity is required. The tendency to manage the terrorist threat
through a harsh top-down regulatory regime often promotes execu-
tivepowerandvalorizesstate’s imperatives.Mindful thatamuscular,
knuckle-duster response in faith matters can do more harm than
55. See further, Eugene K.B. Tan, “Singapore” (country study), in Keeping the
Faith: A Study of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in ASEAN
(Jakarta: Human Rights Resource Centre, 2015), 416–80.
56. SpeechbyMUISPresidentMohamadAlamiMusaat theMosqueLeaders Inves-
titure Ceremony, March 5, 2006.
57. Clifford Geertz, “Toutes Directions: Reading the Signs in an Urban Sprawl,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, no. 3 (1989): 291–306.
58. See the RRG website at http://www.rrg.sg.
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good, thegovernmenthasendeavored tohaveat itsdisposal aswidea
range of regulatory and enforcement options as possible. With these
powers, the government can respond sensitively to threats originat-
ing in the religious realm by calibrating the most appropriate
response vis-a`-vis the threat posed. This is notwithstanding that the
realms of the secular and the sacred cannot always be demarcated
with precision.
Singapore’soverall approachtoterrorismandreligiousextremismis
premised on racial and religious harmony as the “fundamental basis
for our social stability, cohesion and security.”59 Given the overriding
concern with security and the fear of religious conflict as a potent
source of conflict, there are several key legislations that provide a
variety of options as part of the enforcement arsenal in dealing
with individuals and groups in the religious realm that pose a public
order threat.60 Despite the government’s preparedness to use the
various enforcement options afforded to it, the long-standing terror-
ism threat has given grounds for serious reconsideration of the effec-
tivenessofsuchhard-lawmeasures.Legislationalonecannotdealwith
all aspects of religious radicalism, bigotry, andnihilism. This is partic-
ularly so when the battle is not about law enforcement but one that is
fundamentallyconcernedwithwinningtheheartsandmindsofbeliev-
ers and confidence building across communities.
In the immediate aftermath of the initial rounds of JI arrests, the
governmenthadadopted aprivatized approach towhat is essentially
anexistential threat. The collective securityapproach,whichhitherto
had laid the substratum for stable ethnic relations in Singapore, was
sidelined. Instead, the Malay Muslim community bore the brunt of
the concern and responsibility. The community was, for all intents
and purposes, held solely responsible for the radicalization of
a small minority of Muslims. Such a portrayal of the community
being at risk would only make matters worse. This dominant narra-
tive unfairly consigns and insists that full-fledged citizens, who are
Muslims, to wear their religious identity before all other identities
and loyalties. Although the government sought to rally the Muslim
community into action, this privatized approachhad the unintended
effect of marginalizing the mainstream community, thereby threat-
ening mutual security and undermining ethnic relations.
However, the government quickly realized that such an approach
would neither help to isolate the terrorists nor ensure that the terror-
ist ideology did not acquire wider support. Given the nature of the
59. “The Meaning and Importance of the Rule of Law,” keynote address by then
Deputy PrimeMinister, CoordinatingMinister forNational Security, and LawMin-
ister S. Jayakumar at the International Bar Association Rule of Law Symposium,
Singapore, October 19, 2007.
60. This is further discussed in Tan, “Keeping God in Place, 55–82.
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terrorist threat and its dependence on a sympathetic constituency to
draw support and recruits to the cause, the nondiscriminating,
clamping-downstrategymoreoftenthannotmarginalizes, ifnotalien-
ates, theverybedrockoftheMuslimcommunitythat isdependedupon
to form the bulwark against creeping radicalization. Furthermore,
given that people and governments have to cooperate to defeat terror-
ism, policymakers have to fortify and prepare society by having all
communities work together to ensure that society does not unravel
in the aftermath of a terrorist strike through mutual suspicion, dis-
trust,andcollateralviolence.Hence, thepreferenceisforacommunity-
wide or a whole-of-society approach.
Isolating the terrorists, both ideologicallyandonreligiousgrounds,
is the dominant approach now. Consequently, the overwhelming
hard-law emphasis has conceded space for a soft-law approach, rec-
ognizing that the terrorism threat needs a collective and holistic
response from governments and societies alike. The previous,
narrow framing of terrorism as being a Malay Muslim problem was
abandoned. Terrorism isnow framedas a “national problem,” requir-
ing a solution inwhich all Singaporeans, regardless of their racial and
religious allegiance, have a role to play, although the accent is still on
the Muslim community taking the lead.
The aspiration in the soft-law approach is that it provides a process,
a structure for social learning and cooperation. In addition, the soft
law’s “operating system” seeks to imbue a disposition, rather than a
worldview,forcollectivesensitivityandsensibilityamongstakeholders.
Thesearethewaystationstothedevelopmentof trustandconfidenceat
thegrassroots level. In turn, thisprovides the foundation for successful
norm diffusion, socialization, and reproduction. In a generalized trust
environment, the preference is for common ground over confronta-
tion.61 The process of seeking common ground requires deliberation,
which also functions as a coping or quasi-regulatory mechanism in
dealing with uncertainty. In turn, deliberation requires dialogue, com-
promise, and consensus.
Trust remainsafundamental attribute in themeaningful regulation
of religious anxieties and the state’s response to the terrorist threat.
Moreover, the strategic thrust to leverage on the capacity of civil
society in thwarting the terror threat patently needs to be bottom-up
if sustainable bonds are to be developed. The official logic and rea-
soning behind the raison d’etre of the various policy initiatives,
while rational and seemingly persuasive, do not mask the fact that
61. AsUslanernotes, generalized trust is aboutbridgebuilding topeoplewhoare
different from us and provides a basis for tolerance and cooperation: Eric
M. Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
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the strategic mindset of national security considerations inherently
requires the mutual trust between government and the Malay
Muslim community and between the different ethnic communities.
As de facto standard-setting and norm-engendering mechanisms,
soft-law instruments can help ordinary citizens internalize the virtues
of moderation and coexistence. Both hard- and soft-law approaches
seek to weaken terrorism’s appeal and currency. Hard law represents
the coercive dimension, whereas soft-law’s signaling function points
to the relevance and appeal of socio-political values. The DRH and SMI
speak of a normative, desired state of society undergirded by a princi-
pled motivation of establishing what is considered right, appropriate,
and fitting in a socially persuasive and politically legitimate way. In
this way, social control and social order can be maintained and
enhanced. There is now better appreciation of the soft-law approach
in engaging Singaporeans on the merits of building interethnic bonds
and understanding to counter mutual suspicion and doubt. The
soft-lawapproachiscomplementaryandhelpstomakeupforthe inher-
ent limitations of hard law.
Being pre-emptive in approach, soft-law instruments such as codes
ofconductandbestpractices,whenproperly internalized, encourage
and facilitate compliance. Although soft laws do not specifically
deter terrorists fromtheirobjectives, theydoconstrain the terrorists’
ability toharmsocietydirectly. Inmanyrespects, theconscioususeof
soft lawisaconsideredattempt to increase the“harmonyquotient”of
Singaporeans.62Given the threat assessments, thehard-nosed secur-
ity approach pivoting on counterterrorismmeasures persists. Singa-
pore’s primeminister put squarely the inherent vulnerability and the
emphatic challenge facing the country:
The gravest threat to our harmony is a terrorist attack here. Such an attack
will put our ethnic relations under severe strain. This is what happened in
Britain after the London bombings last July. . . . If ever there is an attack
in Singapore, it will severely damage not just our physical infrastructure,
but also the harmonious ethnic relations that underpin our existence as a
nation.This iswhy inSingaporewehaveworkedhardtoreinforce inter-faith
awareness and understanding, so that in a crisis the community network
will hold our society together.63
The jury is still out as to whether the recent policies and initiatives
will be successful in promoting religious moderation within the
Muslim community and enhancing social resilience.
62. EugeneK.B. Tan, “NormingModeration in an ‘Iconic Target’: Public Policy and
the Regulation of Religious Anxieties in Singapore,” Terrorism and Political Vio-
lence 19, no. 4 (December 2007): 443–62.
63. Speech given by PrimeMinister Lee Hsien Loong at the official opening of the
Harmony Centre at An-Nahdhah Mosque, October 7, 2006.
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Given that suicidal terrorists are unlikely to be deterred by coercive
hard laworby “persuasive” soft law, theoperational utilityof soft law
for law enforcement agencies lies in the likelihood that those who
have imbibed the values and norms will be more likely than not to
whistle-blow on or restrain those who might engage in activities
that can undermine societal harmony. Thus, the Malay Muslim com-
munity is expected to take the lead in community policing to
counter the ideological traction of extremism and the glorified use
of violence, especially the “online DIY extremism” variant that is
more insidious anddifficult to surveyanddetect by theauthorities.64
Further, byprivilegingmoderationandcooperation, aswell asbench-
marking and compliance, the DRH and SMI tacitly co-opt civil society
tobe the tripwire against radicals and terrorists. Evenas theDRHand
SMI need to acquire deeper resonance among Singaporeans, it is
crucial that these mechanisms should not foster the cynicism that
they instrumentally aid the security agencies’ surveillance of the reli-
gious sphere. In many respects, although the DRH and SMI have a
potential securitizing effect, they also represent putative empower-
ment in which the various stakeholders can play an active part in
forging resilience.
Conclusion
Terrorismper se is not an existential threat to Singapore. Instead, it is
themindless, knee-jerk reactions to it. Confidence building is needed
to ensure that Singapore builds its stock of adequate social capital
and resilience towithstand threats to its social fabric posedby terror-
ism threats and acts. As no counter-radicalization strategy would be
able to ensure no sign-ups to violent extremism, any expectation of a
risk-free society in the terrorism context is misplaced. Absolute
security is not achievable, and policymakers must be frank about
that. Incrafting theiroverall response to the terror threat, thepolitical
leadership andpolicymakers need to be fully aware of the reality that
terrorist threatshavebeenusedas aconvenient excuse in othercoun-
tries for potentially oppressive policy initiatives, disguised as being
essential for a safer and secure society.
Since 9/11, religion and national security have been even more
intimately linked. Religion and state security are taken seriously in
Singapore, although there has been no overt religious conflict since
Singapore’s hurried independence inAugust 1965. In some respects,
9/11and its aftermathhavedrivenhome themessage that “religious-
inspired” threats to national security are best dealt with by not
64. See “Don’t Dismiss Any Sign of Self-radicalism,” The Straits Times, July 12,
2010.
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indiscriminatelyclampingdownonreligion.Evenasnationalsecurity
comes under threat, the better approach is to ensure that citizens’
religious identities remain secure. Such a paradoxical approach also
entails that civil society play a bigger role in ensuring that the state
and religion are both secure. In short, looking at religion merely as a
security threat is manifestly inadequate in keeping both state and
society safe.
The role of civil society is crucial. Civil society can be meaningfully
inducted to enhance a society’s capacity to deal with the harm and
infuse legitimacy and secure confidence in the measures taken. The
statecannot interfere in religiouspractices evenas itpromotesmoder-
ation within faith communities. It would be remiss to mention the
importance, in the Singaporean context, of the role of non-Muslims.
Confidence building does not happen through the efforts of Muslims
only. Going forward, societies such as Singapore need to calibrate
their responsestoterrorismandthe threats inamanner thatdelicately
balances vigilance and surveillance, resilience vis-a`-vis paranoia and
panic, vigorous law enforcement and a Big Brother–like state.
Any counterterrorism policy (which more often than not puts the
state at the center) or social resilience effort will only work if
Muslims and non-Muslims alikework as full citizens.With the secur-
ity accent in Singapore being on “self-radicalization,” tackling the
more conservative, isolated, or misled variants of Islam will require
more soft power than hard power.65 For Singapore and its Muslim
community, the well-being of Singapore will have to revolve around
the substantive acceptance ofmultiple identities through a balanced
approach of two realms that are important in the life of aMuslim: the
transnational and the national. Toomuch of the formerwill heighten
secular anxieties and raise questions about their loyalty and commit-
ment to secular Singaporean values. Too much of the latter may be
perceived by the Muslims themselves as their dissociation from
their religious moorings.
This commitment to and acceptance of multiple identities and a
pluralism of values is a necessary pathway for all Singaporeans to
live up to their secular duties without sacrificing faithfulness to
their faith. Itmaybeacliche´, but a balancedapproach is vital andsus-
tainable because it ensures the meaningful participation of Muslims
in all facets of national life as full-fledged citizens. On their own, gov-
ernments and civil society cannotdefeat terrorism. It is thismultista-
keholder approach that must inform and drive the effort for an
effective and sustainable bulwark against radicalization and the
forces that seek to divide and destroy our humanity.
65. As of the end of September 2015, nine self-radicalized Singaporeans have
been arrested and detained.
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